THE ENTERPRISE--Understanding Iraq

THE ENTERPRISE--Understanding Iraq

I am writing this lengthy edition of THE ENTERPRISE in a very somber state of mind.  IF you will read it ALL, you will share that state of mind.  I watched President Bush stiffly address the nation and all I could think was "who is this Bush impersonator reading from the tele-prompter?"  Our President and his administration are lost, doubling down on a bet that has already proven to be a loser.  One definition of insanity is "Doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different outcome."  Does that ring ominously appropriate here?

Bush's opponents, whether they are the new Congressional controlling Democrats or people like me--Republicans who are astounded at his actions, don't have many better ideas.  That is the scary part.  The US' staunchest allies, the Brits don't know what else to do either.  Our opponents was the US to get out of Iraq (and perhaps lots of other places) so they can pursue their own self-interests and agendas.  The problem is that when things really fall apart, they will look to us, and condemn us if we don't use our massive resources to somehow "fix it."

Here is where I am, and I hope after you read this, you will be of a similar mindset.  There are two steps to solving any problem, large or small (and Iraq is a biggie--ignoring that it is largely self-inflicted).
1)  Define the problem; 2) Solve the problem.  There is a step that precedes step number 1--understand the nature of the problem.  The remainder of this edition of THE ENTERPRISE will consist of material I came across through a distant relative.  I will not--indeed I cannot--vouch for the author's political agenda nor specifically for his knowledge of the subject.  What I can say is that he has been there, in the midst of this mess, and seems to have taken a far more insightful approach to understanding why we have such a messy problem.

I would say that understanding at least provides a platform for defining the problem accurately.  Once that is done, solutions can be developed.  What I am asking all readers to do is to forward this material ot anyone you know in a position to influence government policy and the search for solutions--Congressmen, Senators, Governors, Lobbyists, Congressional Staffers, Ambassadors, prominetn news media--in other words--blanket those who might help make wise decision on how to proceed when this latest move doesn't work either (like the ones before it).

PLEASE READ ALL OF THIS--IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE OF OUR COUNTRY--AND TO YOUR FUTURE.  Whether you agree or not, the thoughts it contains will stimulate you to form your own opinions.  THEN ACT ON THEM.  And may God Bless America--we certainly need it.

Best, John

Understanding Iraq
Excerpts from materials written by Craig T. Trebilcock, edited for THE ENTERPRISE

It has been said that doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results is one definition of insanity.   Clearly the stability of Iraq is degrading, insurgent and criminal violence is increasing, and yet, the US continues the same policies of the past, but with a larger force as the primary change.  Perhaps not quite “insanity” but close to it.  Clinging to the belief that more military force is the answer to Iraq's internal political struggles, despite four years of failings, reveals a fundamental weakness in the Administration's understanding of Iraqi politics and culture.

The wrong questions are being asked in the Administration on how to create stability to Iraq, and thus, the answers to  will not improve the political outcome in Iraq.  The policy question most frequently asked is, “How can we use military means to stop increasing sectarian violence?” Under that narrow view, the logical answer is increase the amount of force in the unstable areas.  However, if the question posed were - “How can we attain the strategic goals of political stability and democracy in Iraq?” a different set of answers would be required.  Many of these answers, may be politically undesirable to the civilian leadership, and thus the default is to the US military forces to fix an internal Iraqi cultural and political problems.

The answer to how to attain political stability and democracy in Iraq requires a political course change from Washington DC, not a greater military build-up.  During a one-year deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), I (Trebilcock) was in daily contact with pro-Coalition Iraqi officials, uncooperative Baathist officials, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) bureaucrats, and most importantly, the average Iraqi in the streets.  The mission was to coordinate reconstruction of Iraqi legal institutions which required leading convoys throughout southern Iraq six days a week and to then traveling to Baghdad to report developments to relatively isolated policy-makers in the Green Zone on the seventh day.  This experience taught me that policy makers from Washington, during their short Green Zone tours, had little sense of Iraqi culture and priorities, and did not realize how this lack of understanding might adversely affect the success of their plans.

In working with the Iraqis from the street to the Ministerial level a series of principles about Iraqi culture became evident.  These principles dramatically explain and alter the impact of our reconstruction and Iraq's stability.   In order to have a chance for success, US policies and tactics cannot be based solely on more military force, but must incorporate the understanding of these principles:

• Societal Values:  Iraqi society is built upon strict patriarchal hierarchy under which the sheikh has absolute power over the tribe.  The concept of civil government centralized at the provincial and national level is relatively new (a few decades) to Iraqis, whose social structure is still tribal.  The Western concept of democracy and the value of sharing power are almost meaningless in their society.  It is only important to Iraqi officials while the US officials are in the room dispensing benefits.
• Loyalty: The major concern of Iraqi officials is not democracy or the political evolution of an Iraqi nation-state.  It is the use of their position to gain personal wealth, as well as benefits for their extended family and tribe. This observation is not a character attack; it simply reflects the reality that in a Bedouin society, where the foundational social unit is the tribe, primary loyalty is to that tribe.  Saddam's government was packed with family and tribal members because they were loyal and it was expected of him, within the culture, to bring benefits to his tribe by his prominence.  Other Iraqi officials are no different in this regard.
• Defending What Is Valued: If Iraqis do not value something, they will not fight for it.  If they don't, they won't.  This is one reason why the Iraqi army put forth a poor showing in the Gulf War and in OIF1.  They melted away, as they were being asked to fight for something in which they did not believe.  And yet, these same Iraqis are tenaciously fighting the world's predominant military power in their tribal areas and cities.  The difference?  The insurgents are now fighting for something they believe in - expelling foreign troops and sectarian enemies from tribal areas that they hold dear.
• Historic Bedouin Origins: In a society that is evolving from a harsh Bedouin desert existence, where water and other staples of life are in short supply, the Iraqis have learned that the group who controls the resources lives, and the one who does not, dies. Individually, Iraqis are a warm and generous people.  As the size of their group grows, however, whether that be a family unit, tribe, or an entire sect, their generosity to those not within their social circle wanes.   The historic sense that one only takes care of his own - borne of their harsh desert life - minimizes their collective willingness to compromise or share resources or power.  The lessons learned through centuries of desert survival are that only the strong get the resources and survive.  Sharing of resources or power outside ones' own tribe is an unfamiliar and foreign concept.  Armed struggle for power, not compromise and.or democratic style debate, is the norm.
• Conflicting Values: Trading for personal or tribal gain is part of the Iraqi/Bedouin culture.  Self-sacrifice for general welfare is not.  Thus, frustration with “Why don't the Iraqis just try to get along for their mutual benefit,” is a Western, culturally based value judgment applied to a society, where violent conflict to gain advantage is the norm.  If the current Sunni insurgency is to be stopped the Iraqi insurgents must come to believe that the personal benefits of a peace with the Shiites clearly outweigh the gains by continuing to fight for dominance.   Increased US military operations will inflame this struggle for political dominance, not diminish it.
• Time & the Concept of “En Sh'allah”: Iraqis do not share Western concepts on the use, passage, or value of time.  They sincerely believe that if a matter is truly important that Allah will control the outcome and the personal efforts of individuals are merely tangential to that outcome.  This is the source of the frustration every US soldier who has served in Iraq and seen lack of resolve, follow-through, or reliability from his Iraqi counterpart.  The concept of “En Sh'allah” (Only if God wills will it happen) overshadows all aspects of Iraqi life, including reconstruction and political evolution.  As such, the political resolution, if any, in Iraq will be done according to the glacial pace of Iraqi society, not based on a US timetable.  This point is critical to recognize in setting realistic timetables for the continued presence of US troops in Iraq. 

Under these cultural principles, relying simply upon foreign military force to impose a lasting political stability or democracy upon Iraqis will not work.  In fact, a military victory was won in 2003.  It is the peace and the post-conflict stability that is being lost by civilian leaders' attempts to use the wrong tools (military force) to change Iraqi cultural anda societal values.   Lack of understanding of Iraq's culture and politics by the US civilian leadership has brought the US back to the brink of “losing Iraq.”

The weakness of Iraqi security forces is pointed to as a justification for maintaining or increasing US troop involvement.  However, considering principles 1, 2, and 3, it's apparent that the weakness of the Iraqi security forces (police & military) and their lack of reliability (in our eyes) are normal under the political circumstances we've imposed on the Iraqis.  As the concept of democracy does not have value in their culture, the willingness to fight and die for its success is virtually nonexistent.  Instead, consistent with their cultural norms, Iraqis will use official or security positions to gain personal and family advantage, even if Baghdad burns about them. 

Thus, the Iraqi troops we are training will be enthusiastic while they are being fed and clothed, as opposed to joining the 80% unemployed young men in Iraq.  However, it is misguided to believe their willingness to serve is to preserve democracy or a US-backed central Government.  We can provide all the military training we want, but only the Iraqis themselves can provide the will to rid their country of foreign fighters and internal insurgents.  Iraqi Army troops fought for Saddam (albeit ineffectively), as death was the consequence for failing to do so.  Under US tutelage that is no longer the case. Whether enthusiasm for food and a paycheck is a strong enough motivation for the fledgling Iraqi security forces to stand toe to toe with a zealous enemy remains to be seen.

The above history does not mean that Iraqis are not capable of stabilizing Iraq eventually.  It does mean that it has to be done by Iraqis, on Iraqi terms, in Iraqi time frames, and based on values for which they are willing to fight.  Self-preservation may be one of those values - democracy is certainly not.  Promoting the integrity and power of their respective tribes within a new Iraq is definitely such a cultural value.  US policies built upon the premise that Iraqi officials and security forces will rally to Western political values if only we “stay the course" a while longer are naive  and underlie our repeated misunderstanding about how to reconstruct Iraq.

It is against these deeply ingrained cultural principles that we can now evaluate the strategic merit of US policies that rely upon US military forces to fight their way to a political stability or democracy in Iraq.  Without a doubt, the iraqi people rose to the opportunity to vote in elections that might help determine their future.  Also without a doubt, theiy lacked or failed to understand of how this "democratic" process might unfold and how deeply parts of it conflicted with cultural traditions The logic runs, apparently, that the Iraqi forces are not ready quite yet, but that with a few more months and an additional tens of thousands of US troops, all can yet be solved militarily--either by defeating the insurgents through force of US arms, or by buying enough time for a meaningful Iraqi security force to stand up and do so.   This supposition ignores the principles cited earlier and is based upon "hope" as a cause of action, rather than cultural reality.

The proposed military "surge" also ignores the lessons of the past four years of the limits on what a PFC with an M16 can and cannot accomplish on a street corner in Baghdad.  The US soldier or marine can secure his street corner, but he cannot make the Iraqis who walk past him care enough about their government to change deeply ingrained culture.  He can engage insurgents or criminals with effective firepower, but he cannot make the Iraqis willing to risk disclosing the locations of insurgent cells when they do not believe in the US mission.

Nor can he cause the Iraqis to forget hundreds of years of cultural hatred, to accept that peace with ones' enemy is better than watching him die.  Each of these goals is a necessary component for political stability in Iraq and must come from within, not from additional US combat brigades.  It is not the insurgency with its roadside bombs or criminals perpetrating mass kidnappings that are defeating the US mission.  It is the fact that our civilian leadership has defined “victory” in Iraq as a stable, democratic government--a potentially unachievable goal in any near-term time frame.  Building the parameters for success upon values and goals that the Iraqis themselves do not share is leading us toward failure, despite our strength of arms.   Accordingly, the disconnect between a non-democratic Iraqi culture and US political goals will not be repaired by sending more US troops.

We have been "squeezing the balloon" with anti-insurgent operations for four years, clamping down on one area only to watch it bulge elsewhere.  Today's theory is that enough force exerted upon Baghdad and Al Anbar province will win the day or buy enough time for the Iraqis to “stabilize” and provide their own security.  The fact that it has been tried and failed in Fallujah, Najaf, and a variety of other Sunni Triangle hot spots is not deterring the Administration planners.  This deadly game of the US military playing “Catch the Insurgent” will continue until it is the Iraqis who are controlling their streets and have decided that they no longer wish to fight, based upon values important to their culture.   There will be much more bloodshed before this happens-a hard fact the politicians are unwilling to face.  Before stability can be restored it may require engaging our strategic enemies in discussions and deal making--another hard fact the Administration is unwilling to face.

It may even require partitioning the country into autonomous regions-a solution fraught with complexities, but a potential reality given the de facto cultural partitions that currently exist  There is no easy solution in Iraq, but the discourse in Washington that considers no diplomatic, cultural or political avenues to resolve a political and cultural problem stands an excellent chance of seizing strategic political defeat from the jaws of the 2003 battlefield victory.
One conclusion coming out of Washington that is directly on point comes from Recommendation 41 of the Iraq Study Group Report:

The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if Iraq does not implement its planned changes.  America's other security needs and the future of our military cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government.   

This simple paragraph succinctly captures the most important lesson learned in Iraq.  Our troops, while battling a largely Sunni dominated insurgency, are the insurance policy for those same Sunnis that the Shiites, with their 3:1 population advantage will not simply wipe the Sunnis from the map.  Our continued presence provides a rallying point and Arab street credit for a violent insurgency killing its own people, as their efforts can be wrapped up in a “defeat the American occupiers” wrapper.

Our continued presence is also the insurance policy for the lives of the Iraqi government bureaucrats who have sided with the Coalition.  Despite public pronouncements that they wish to have US forces depart, these Iraqi officials have little desire to see US forces disappear over the horizon, leaving them alone with a weak government, uncertain military, and a combative civil population.  In short, our continued (or the proposed expanded) presence has outlived its usefulness and benefits both the insurgency and the weak Iraqi government, but does little to promote the long-term political stability in Iraq that is in our national interest.

Our civilian leadership is desperately seeking to avoid the embarrassment of political defeat in Iraq by proposing to send in its military reserve, calling it “a temporary surge” for political consumption.  From a military operational standpoint this will enable us to secure more territory-but only in the short run.  From the strategic political standpoint this will highlight the inability of a weak Iraqi government to rule its own people.   It will create more civilian casualties amongst an already embittered populace.  In the end, by ignoring the cultural and internal political realities of Iraq, in favor of a one-dimensional approach based upon military intervention, the US is increasingly likely to “win the battle and lose the war."

Someone in charge in Washington needs to realize this!

Craig T. Trebilcock is a Lieutenant Colonel (promotable) in the US Army Reserve, who served in Iraq during 2003 reconstructing the Iraqi legal system.  He is author of a novel on that experience titled "One Weekend A Month."